Restoring Legitimacy to the WTO - Part 5

image courtesy of Anupam Chander 

Despite the repeated emphasis on equal representation and the WTO director-general's admission that reform is necessary, the Quad, a select group of four countries continue to command an ambiguous yet tangible authority over WTO affairs. For a long time, the Quad has consisted of The United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada. The Quad members often lead what are known as 'green room' caucus meetings, which regularly exclude developing countries.(Albin 761) There are no rules regulating the assembly of these meetings, which makes their outcome unfair, regardless of the parties affected. In addition, because these meetings are held almost surreptitiously, it is impossible to determine what effect they have on subsequent decisions. 

The combination of inadequate legitimating procedures and lack of qualitative deliberations makes it unlikely that WTO outcomes will be just in the middle of power politics, exclusion, bargaining, and uncritical knowledge. The consensus reached in this multilateral sphere is most likely to be coerced and one-sided- to the advantage of the western countries. Proponents for the Quad contest that other member states form alliances, however the latter are used to represent common socio-economic interests between geographically neighboring states, while the Quad is simply a coalition of the most economically developed member states, which for a  lack of transparency, lead us to believe that it is for the purpose of hegemony. The group should either state its primary purpose for formation and adhere to the highest standards of transparency, or be dissolved. 


In a lecture to the UN Audiovisual Library of International Law on 15 June 2008, Director-General Pascal Lamy stated that a decade ago, the Quad may have been a core group used for the purposed of testing new rules first, however, the major group today is the G-4, comprised of the US, EC, India and Brazil. Despite declaring the current membership of the major group, the director-general still does not shed light on what the designation means, rather he states that it is, "not possible to propose any new rule without testing the waters with countries like China , South Africa, and Indonesia, just to name a few" (Kapoor 530).

Fairness is of immense importance because of the diverse interests of nations-states and the various comparative advantages that they have in fields affected by the WTO such as technology, investment, and education .Developing countries, budgeted on extremely low appropriations often cannot afford to host as many representatives as other developed countries in Geneva or any other locations where WTO representatives may need to be permanently situated. This affects the representation of the respective nation-state at meetings and within the organization in general. The absence of any nation's representatives further reduces any chance that the interests of that nation are considered at the brainstorming or negotiation procedures.  Representatives from developing countries may also have less extensive education, yet have to collaborate with lawyers and other professionals from developing countries who have more extensive education. Professionals in developing countries, especially from the Quad also have the advantage of being trained and being familiar with the business lexicon and processes of meetings. While these differences may seem subtle, variances in education and a home court advantage can have a tremendous effect on the negotiation process and ultimately, the trade policies implemented by a state.

TBC.. 

Works Cited

Albin, Cecilia. "Using Negotiation to promote legitimacy; an assessment of proposals for reforming the WTO." International Affairs 84.4 (2008): 757-75. Print.

Restoring Legitimacy to the WTO - Part 4

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NO DEMOCRACY WITHOUT TRANSPARENCY

Albin and other trade experts such as current and former WTO-affiliated officials have pointed to the "lack of transparency and insufficient representation of parties in negotiations as key contributors to the erosion of legitimacy"(757). The procedures currently in place contain features that are eroding the legitimacy of the organization, leading to the consideration of how to build legitimacy.. Many scholars use the term 'procedural justice' to describe the constitution of legitimacy in the procedure of making a decision. To determine when procedural justice has been achieved, Albin points to G.S. Levanthal's six criteria; consistency (across persons and over time); bias suppression; accuracy; correct ability ( of decisions made in error); representativeness (of parties affected by the respective decisions), and ethicality(763). In legal studies, procedural justice is determined by: accuracy, consistency, impartiality, reversibility, transparency and voice. The latter are presented in order to show the commonly accepted characteristics across different studies. The prevailing fundamental principle of procedural justice in either field of study is the participation in decision-making by the affected party (Albin 763).

The only way to hold to the WTO and its procedures accountable for equal and fair representation is for the organization to assert a standard of 100% transparency in all affairs. In the new millennium and recent years especially, this issue has been recognized by WTO officials. Director-general Pascal Lamy has publicly admitted that the decision making procedures need to be re-modeled, stating that "the procedures and rules of this organization have not supported the weight of the task" (Albin 758).National economies and the socio-economic well being of their citizens are at stake, which is why lesser standards are unacceptable.

Despite the repeated emphasis on equal representation and the WTO director-general's admission that reform is necessary, the Quad, a select group of four countries continue to command an ambiguous yet tangible authority over WTO affairs. For a long time, the Quad has consisted of The United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada. The Quad members often lead what are known as 'green room' caucus meetings, which regularly exclude developing countries.(Albin 761) There are no rules regulating the assembly of these meetings, which makes their outcome unfair, regardless of the parties affected. In addition, because these meetings are held almost surreptitiously, it is impossible to determine what effect they have on subsequent decisions. The combination of inadequate legitimating procedures and lack of qualitative deliberations makes it unlikely that WTO outcomes will be just in the middle of power politics, exclusion, bargaining, and uncritical knowledge. The consensus reached in this multilateral sphere is most likely to be coerced and one-sided- to the advantage of the western countries. Proponents for the Quad contest that other member states form alliances, however the latter are used to represent common socio-economic interests between geographically neighboring states, while the Quad is simply a coalition of the most economically developed member states, which for a lack of transparency, lead us to believe that it is for the purpose of hegemony. The group should either state its primary purpose for formation and adhere to the highest standards of transparency, or be dissolved.

TBC..

Works Cited

Albin, Cecilia. "Using Negotiation to promote legitimacy; an assessment of proposals for reforming the WTO." International Affairs 84.4 (2008): 757-75. Print.

Restoring Legitimacy to the WTO - Part 3

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WHICH CAME FIRST, CREDIBILITY OR LEGITIMACY?

The credibility of the WTO has regressed since the days of GATT, its predecessor, for today its affairs are plagued with contentions of legitimacy and hegemonic tendency. It is not easy to pinpoint where matters went wrong, although it may help to start with what is wrong. Unless an organization conducts affairs in a legitimate way, it cannot build, nor sustain credibility, in which case its purpose for existence is void. Cecilia Albin has condensed the issue of WTO legitimacy to two questions; does the WTO actually attain legitimacy from its decision making and negotiation procedures, and how have these same procedures contributed to setbacks in the organization? (757). 

First, we must define legitimacy, in order to analyze the issue in a uniform fashion. The final outcome of WTO operation is the trade agreements made between nations, and since these agreements are forged through a series of processes, we can review each individual component. The main building block of legitimacy for the WTO is the series procedures taken to build consensus. "Procedures refer broadly to mechanisms used in the negotiation process to come to an agreement. They encompass formal, explicit rules and practices as well as more diffuse or informal ones"(Albin 758). The WTO website proclaims that the format for operation is a rules-based system, where the rules are borne from the agreements that nation-states reach after negotiation..Formal, explicit rules are in correlation with this system, but the diffuse, informal rules leave opportunity for faction and bias.                                   

Albin supports the claim that brainstorming of new ideas and bargaining actually takes place at the exclusive green room caucuses which are usually convened by either the director-general or a committee chairperson. Inter-mixed with these caucuses are other informal meetings where "key players" meet as well as other "off the record plenary meetings open to all members" (761). Nevertheless, Why does the WTO need to any have any off the record meetings? For an organization of its size and far-reaching influence, any off the record affairs bring into question the transparency of its processes. Albin notes that all organizations, need the flexibility of some informal discussions, but it becomes troublesome if informality plays too large a role, as is the case at the WTO. The WTO website even points out, that informal meetings have a more decisive role than formal ones.

Informality in itself means that there are no set guidelines to which an affair must adhere to and the parties involved are responsible for drawing their own boundaries, or not. Throughout this analysis, one must not forget that nation-states have diverse interests and often use the equivalent retaliation strategy in dealing with one another. This results in only friendly nations being invited to informal meetings which may or may not affect them, and thus a total loss of the quality of fairness in the procedures. "The wide scope for informal and ad hoc procedures clearly favors the more powerful and influential members in the developed world" (Albin 762). 

Informality essentially creates an atmosphere where fair practices such as  equal representation are disregarded, and thus representation is based on superficial values like national wealth and commanding leaders. It is not that these values are superficial generally, rather that that they should not qualify any single nation for preferential treatment from an organization that claims to be democratic. As soon as superficial values replace democratic principles, illicit activities such as coercion and bribery can become rampant and even commonplace. For example, towards the end of the Uruguay Round, the US threatened to withdraw from the round table when developing countries hesitated to sign agreements on intellectual property rights and investments and services.

TBC..

Works Cited

Albin, Cecilia. "Using Negotiation to promote legitimacy; an assessment of proposals for reforming the WTO." International Affairs 84.4 (2008): 757-75. Print.